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CHAPTER 6 
WHERE DRAGONS FALTER:  
Labor Politics and the Democratization of Civil Society
in South Korea and Taiwan 
PAUL G. BUCHANAN AND KATE NICHOLLS
Introduction
One of the most under-researched aspects of the recent literature on 
democratization is labor politics. Perhaps because of the importance of political 
party elites in (re)constituting electoral government in previously authoritarian 
societies, and perhaps because the imperatives of market globalization appear to 
make concerns about organized labor irrelevant except as obstacles to be 
overcome on the way to labor market “flexibilization,” attention to the role of 
organized labor in democratizing societies has been confined to labor specialists, a 
few comparative politics scholars and government agencies.  As the intelligence 
community well understands, labor politics matter for many reasons. This is 
particularly so in transitional societies, and the cases of South Korea and Taiwan 
are particularly illuminating. 
Labor politics do not occur in a vacuum, especially during the transition from 
authoritarian regimes to democracy. The birth, rebirth, resumption, regeneration 
or escalation of labor movement activity are all aspects of the resurrection or 
regeneration of civil society. The issue is one of claiming expanded citizenship 
rights. These rights may be claimed not only by organized labor but by other 
disenfranchised segments of the population. These latter groups are not defined 
by their relations in production and consequently do not occupy a position of 
strategic importance in the economic apparatus—and in the concerns of policy-
makers. Yet given its structural gravity in the economy and the common cause it 
shares with these other groups, organized labor has the potential to be a leading 
agent for the substantive democratization of society as a whole. 
Kate Nicholls acknowledges a travel grant supplied by the Graduate Studies Office, Department of 
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Korea and Taiwan represent two “most similar” cases based upon their 
structural and political similarities but there are key differences with regards to 
their labor politics.1 Although both are relatively small export platforms with a 
rigid anti-communist (and slowly eroding Cold War) political orientation, in 
important respects they represent significantly different approaches towards labor 
politics. South Korean unions are inserted as opposition pressure groups in the 
political system with increasing economic presence, while the Taiwanese labor 
movement has been molded by its history as the child of the Kuomintang (KMT) 
party. 
Case Study and Method 
South Korea and Taiwan can be considered “most similar” cases due to one 
general structural similarity and several socio-political similarities.2 On a structural 
plane, both countries are inserted in the global market as value-added commodity 
export platforms, with similar industrial, services, and finance sectors and a 
shrinking agricultural base. Both have large urbanized populations, including a 
sizable middle class and organized labor force. Both have shifted over the last 
twenty years from labor-intensive to capital-intensive manufacturing.  
Politically, both witnessed top-down transformations from authoritarianism to 
procedural democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Elections were used 
as part of the liberalization process and in both cases it took over a decade for the 
consolidating election (in which power changed hands) to occur. Both have 
histories of Japanese colonial rule. Both are fragments of nations divided in the 
late 1940s by the ideological confrontations of the Cold War. Both are staunchly 
anti-communist and as a result both are firm U.S. allies that largely depend on 
America for their foreign trade and defense. Both have had at least two relatively 
transparent, free and fair national presidential and parliamentary elections during 
the last decade, with presidential power rotating between parties in the last round 
of elections in the late 1990s. Both have traditionally placed limits on the labor’s 
freedom of action and subordinated it politically and economically to business.3
Korea and Taiwan can be singled out from other countries in Asia such as 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Vietnam or the Philippines (to say nothing of 
North Korea, Japan or the People’s Republic of China) because none of these 
nations have both the structural and political similarities mentioned above. Some 
may have similar economic relations with the global market but are simply not 
democratic in even the loosest sense of the word (Singapore, Malaysia, Hong 
Kong). Others simply do not have the same levels of development (the 
Philippines, Thailand) or are far more developed (Japan). Some simply are neither 
1 Theodore H. Meckstroth, “‘Most Different Systems’ and ‘Most Similar Systems:’ A study in the Logic of 
Comparative Inquiry,” Comparative Political Studies, V.8, N.2 (July 1975): 132-157. 
2 On “most similar” case method see Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry.  NY: 
John Wiley: 1970. 
3 An explicit and excellent effort to outline the structural and political bases for the comparison of Korean and Taiwan 
is made by Karl J. Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995: 
1-27. 
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democratic nor capitalist (North Korea, Vietnam), while China is a huge state 
transiting to capitalism under the aegis of continuing one-party authoritarian rule. 
South Korea and Taiwan also exhibit long traditions of state corporatism in 
the field of interest-group administration.4 These systems reinforced an ethos of 
hierarchy, exploitation, managerial paternalism and patriarchy in both nations.5
Yet there were differences between them. On the one hand, the combination of 
an Asiatic mode of production (premised on super-exploitation of human labor) 
and modern versions of oriental despotism (including authoritarian workplace 
relations between employers and employees) gave rise to what can be described as 
despotic labor politics in South Korea.6
In the numbers of hours worked; in the risks to which they were exposed in 
the workplace; in the number of fatal injuries they incurred; in the arbitrary and 
capricious manner in which they were treated (especially women); in the physical 
repression to which they were subjected by their bosses and the state; and in the 
gross limitations on their rights and freedoms as both workers and citizens, before 
the 1980s the Korean working classes suffered under labor relations regimes that 
have few equals in terms of their authoritarian nature.7
In contrast, although also profoundly paternalistic and hierarchical in 
production and in terms of organized labor’s relationship to the dominant 
Kuomintang, and selectively repressive at times, the Taiwanese version was much 
more focused on securing labor cooperation along with its subordination. This 
had more to do with the concerns of the exiled mainland Chinese elite in securing 
Taiwanese acquiescence to their rule than with securing working class consent per 
se. At any rate, Taiwanese labor politics has been far less coercive than that of 
South Korea; more paternalistic than despotic. In any case, neither approach 
allowed for union autonomy, independence or freedom of action, characteristics 
that would be essential for democratic consolidation to succeed. 
4 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990: 27 (Korea), 27, 228, 253, 294-95 (Taiwan).  
5 In emphasizing the repressive aspects of authoritarian labor relations in these two cases, we clearly echo the 
argument of Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1989. 
6 According to Jong-Il You, the complete political exclusion of labor, the gross restrictions on its freedom of action, 
its repeated and severe repression, and the virtual absence of a social welfare system (to include no minimum wage 
until 1988) were coupled with “the managerial culture of authoritarian paternalism—authoritarian oppression for labor 
discipline and paternalistic cooptation for worker motivation—and the managerial practice of personalized 
hierarchical control.” Jong-Il You, “Changing capital-labor relations in South Korea,” in Juliet Sehor and Jong-Il You 
(eds), Capital, the State and Labor. Aldershot: Edward Elgar (1995): 121. On oriental despotism, see Robert C. Tucker, 
ed., The Marx-Engels Reader. NY: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972: 596; on the Asiatic mode of production see 
ibidem: 5; and L. Krader, The Asiatic mode of production: sources, development and critique in the writings of Karl Marx. Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1975. We recognize that even this characterization does not encompass the cultural totality of the working 
class experience in Korea or elsewhere. For an introductory brief on the neglected dimensions of Asian labor studies, 
see Prabhu Mohapatra, Andrew Wess and Samita Sen, “Asian Labor: A Debate on Culture, Consciousness and 
Representation,” Amsterdam: CLARA: Working Papers on Asian Labor N.1 (1997). 
7 According to the 1987 ILO Yearbook, South Koreans worked an average of 53.8 hours a week, had the biggest 
gender differential in pay (women earning 44 percent of male salaries in 1980) and had a rate of fatal injuries more 
than double that of Singapore, Hong Kong, Argentina, Mexico, the US and Japan. As cited in You (1995): 116, 121 
(Table 4.7). 
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Labor Unions as Political Actors 
Labor politics is as important, if not more so, to the study of transitional political 
regimes as it is to established and consolidated capitalist democracies. A system of 
electoral representation based upon the universal franchise and capitalist 
production requires the ongoing contingent consent of subordinate groups, of 
which organized labor is one of the most crucial. Only democratic regimes 
simultaneously require the consent of elites and the mass of people who 
constitute the human element that drives the economic machine. The 
simultaneous reproduction of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
contingent consent is therefore a distinctive characteristic of democratic capitalist 
systems.8
The industrial relations literature sees unions as social interlocutors who 
defend the material interests of their members within production, and who 
together with employers see collective bargaining as the preferred instrument 
through which conflicts over material interests are resolved. This framework 
promotes mutual second-best negotiated outcomes that serve as the substantive 
bases for the “spontaneous” (in that it emerges as an outcome of the autonomous 
choices of collective agents within self-reproducing institutional settings) class 
compromise that sits at the core of democratic capitalist reproduction.9 The 
impact of this compromise extends past the politics of production. 
We make no pretence of being able to cover all the ways in which people 
consent to the socio-economic and political status quo, much less the cultural and 
ideological prisms through which mass consent is filtered.10 Instead, we 
concentrate on two levels: political consent, evidenced by organized labor’s 
relationship with political parties and the working class vote in national elections; 
and material consent (or consent at the level of production), which is measured by 
wages, strikes and collective bargains. 
Organized labor serves as a leader of subordinate groups in civil society 
because of its structural location and its efforts to expand worker’s rights within 
the process of production. It carries strategic weight in the economy, which makes 
8 On the horizontal dimensions of democratic regimes see Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in 
New Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, V.9, N.3, (1998): 122-126.  On the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
consent, See Paul G. Buchanan, State, Labor, Capital: Democratizing Class Relations in the Southern Cone. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, Chapters 1-2. The original take on the necessity of consent for hegemonic rule is 
provided by Antonio Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey N. 
Smith. NY: International Publishers, 1971. 
9 For a sampling of the literature see James Barbash, The Elements of Industrial Relations. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1984; and Theodore Kochan, Robert Mckerse and Paulo. Capelli, “Strategic Choice and Industrial 
Relations Theory,” Industrial Relations, V.22, N.1 (1984).  The material bases of consent and class compromise are 
elaborated by Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, “The Structure of Class Conflict under Democratic 
Capitalism,” American Political Science Review, V.76, N.2 (1982): 215-38. 
10 For examples of those who do attempt to build a more comprehensive picture of this, see Louis Althusser, 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, London: New Left Books, 1971: 
121-73; M. Barrett, The Politics of Truth, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes 
in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1979; Antonio Gramsci,
Selections from the Prison Notebooks; P. Q. Hirst, On Law and Ideology, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1979; Nicos 
Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London: New Left Books, trans Patrick Camiller, 1978; and Goran Therborn, The 
Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology, London: Verso, 1980. 
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it harder to ignore than non-productive groups. This gives it a leadership role 
when the subordinate group voice is organized around material and ideological 
demands.11 In pursuing rights over the labor process, unions help expand basic 
notions of citizenship and entitlement beyond their immediate sphere of 
influence. The labor movement thus triggers a “coat-tail effect” in that weaker 
groups can tie their demands to organized labor’s political agenda, thereby 
expanding the horizontal networks that are the collective bases for the 
democratization of civil society. This in turn produces a “snow-ball effect” in that 
the cumulative weight of these combined demands impacts more heavily on the 
political-institutional structure and economic apparatus. 
The higher the productive and political level at which working class interests 
are aggregated and the more they are linked to the demands of other collective 
agents, the more unions will be able to defend the material and political fortunes 
of their memberships, attract the support of other subordinate groups and 
influence the course and content of public policy. This depends on the 
institutional framework in which organized labor is inserted as a political and 
economic agent. This network of institutions, organizations and practices can be 
referred to as the labor politics partial regime.12
South Korea 
Prior to 1987 and the holding of direct civilian presidential elections, organized 
labor was a politically repressed, organizationally weak and economically 
subordinate collective actor in South Korean society. Under the authoritarian 
labor codes prior to the 1990s, unions were prohibited from political activities, 
strikes were outlawed, collective bargaining could only occur at the shop level, 
and large segments of the workforce were prohibited from organizing at all 
(including all of the public sector). National-level unions were puppet 
organizations with little more than paper status, foremost amongst these being the 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), created as an official organ of the 
ruling party under the Rhee (1948–60) government, reorganized and overseen by 
the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) under the Park government (1961–
79) in 1963, placed under further restrictions by the revamped National Security 
Commission (formerly KCIA) under the Chun government of 1980–87. Under 
the dictatorial labor relations system all unions had to affiliate with the FKTU, 
only one union was allowed per enterprise, no strikes were permitted and no 
union political activities allowed. It was an exclusionary state corporatist labor 
relations system in which the state, not unions, determined worker’s fortunes. 
This state-dependent type of initial political incorporation of labor eventually led 
11 This is discussed at some length in Paul G. Buchanan (1995): Ch.3.  Also see Colin Crouch, Trade Unions: The Logic of 
Collective Action. London: Fontana Books, 1983; and Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, “Two Logics of Collective 
Action,” in Maurice Zeitlin, ed., Political Power and Social Theory 1. Greenwood, CT: JAI Press, 1980: 69-117.  
12 P.C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Democracy and the Representation of Social Groups,” American Behavioral 
Scientist, V.35 N.4/5 (March 1992): 422-50. 
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to a divided form of labor political insertion once independent shop-level unions 
began to organize outside of the FKTU umbrella in the 1970s and 1980s.13
Led by female workers in the textile industry in the mid 1970s, a number of 
grassroots unions emerged that periodically engaged in wildcat and political 
solidarity strikes to advance both their immediate material interests as well as the 
opening of the political system. Although this often resulted in the death and 
imprisonment of their leaders, it also took a cumulative toll on both the state and 
employers, especially during times of tight labor markets and export demand—
both of which were the case in the late 1980s. Ironically, the heroism of the 
female workers led not their advancement but to their eventual substitution by 
male workers as leaders of the independent union movement, something that was 
in equal part product of the shifts in development strategy away from the textile 
industry in the early 1980s and the ingrained patriarchal structure of Korean 
society. 
After the Korean War, Korea adopted a policy of “compressed development” 
based upon a state-led, foreign-dependent economic model centered on the family 
conglomerates known as chaebol. The country embarked on “primary” import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1950s and “primary” export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) in the 1960s (“primary” referring to the promotion of 
labor-intensive consumer non-durable manufacturing), followed by “secondary” 
ISI in the 1970s and “secondary” EOI in the 1980s (“secondary” referring to 
technology-intensive durable consumer and capital goods manufacturing). While 
this served to promote rapid and sustained growth for over thirty years, it also led 
to serious dislocations each time one phase was replaced by another. These 
dislocations were acutely felt in the workplace, and came to be the center of labor 
unrest. In addition, it produced serious friction between business groups in the 
old and new productive sectors, which had a direct impact on politics in a country 
already rent by regional and personal rivalries. Specifically, these developmental 
junctures produced a series of political crises between reformers and hard-liners 
within the various military governments that succeeded each other in power 
throughout this period, and which led to the all-out power conflicts that resulted 
in the murder of president Park Chung Hee in 1979. 
Illegal strike activity accelerated after Park’s assassination. The State-
sponsored move towards capital-intensive industrialization for export in the early 
1980s shifted the composition of the workforce from predominately unskilled 
female workers in labor-intensive industries such as textiles to skilled male 
workers in petrochemicals, automobile manufacturing, shipbuilding and steel 
manufacturing. This made it more difficult for the authorities to ignore union 
demands (even if they continued to be repressed). Since male unionists were both 
better educated and less servile than female workers (as part of a more general 
feature of Korean society) the level of militancy displayed by the union movement 
increased. In addition, students began to establish ties with the labor unions as the 
13 The notion of initial incorporation is offered by Ruth Berins` Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: 
Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1991): 
15-18, 161-68, 752-53, 783-85. The characterization of forms of incorporation and insertion are ours.  
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educational requirements of skilled labor positions increased along with the 
demand for the latter. 
As a result, after years of relative quiescence under the dictatorships, 
organized labor began to flex its newfound muscle in the early 1980s—although 
still within limits acceptable to the ruling elites. By the time of the regime change 
brought about by the direct presidential elections in December 1987, this 
newfound strength had spilled into the streets in the form of dozens of wildcat 
strikes and national demonstrations in favor of democracy. The summer of 1987 
was marked by a massive wave of strikes and political protests in favor of the 
transitional moment, and briefly saw the convergence of working and middle class 
interests along with students and farmers in favor of democracy—something that 
rapidly dissipated once the new regime was inaugurated in 1988. However, the 
constitution under which the first elected government was installed was crafted by 
the departed dictatorship, which ensured an ongoing authoritarian influence in 
labor relations. 
The election of the government of former general Roh Tae Woo was a mere 
formality in the transfer of power and did little more than grant workers the legal 
right to form autonomous shop unions. It did not recognize their political role or 
higher-level organizations. In response, following upon the successes of 
independent shop union activism, in January 1990 an independent labor 
confederation was created. The Korean Alliance Of Genuine Trade Unions 
(KAGTU), later reorganized in 1995 as the Korean Confederation of Trade 
Unions (KCTU), grouped the more restive elements of the labor movement both 
before and after the KCTU was legalized in 1999. Along with the move towards 
electoral politics and the relaxation of authoritarian controls, this forced the 
FKTU to distance itself from its erstwhile masters in the Korean security services 
in order to retain a presence with the rank and file. This moderation subsequently 
allowed for the formation of tactical alliances with the KCTU, such as during the 
general strike of December 1997-January 1998. 
The emergence of an independent labor movement also allowed unions to 
develop ties with militant sectors of the student movement, which also were 
outlawed or repressed throughout the initial democratization period. Even so, for 
most of Korean society unions were considered suspect, more often than not due 
to a strongly ingrained anti-communist ethos inherited from the partition of the 
Korean Peninsula and reinforced by a steady dose of government propaganda. 
Notwithstanding the lack of general support, the advances of the 1980s gave 
unions the first significant independent presence on the social and political scene; 
something that bore fruit after the initial opening process which began in 1987. 
In 1987 the level of industrial conflict rose exponentially, as did the number 
of unions (see Table 6.1). The number of workdays lost similarly peaked in 1987 
due to the explosion of popular protests in favor of democratization with over 6 
million workdays lost, and after remaining relatively high for the next five years, 
declined steadily to a low of 393,000 in 1992 before rebounding to over a million 
in 1998 as a result of the general strike that greeted the New Year. 
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TABLE 6.1 
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Most strike activity initially concerned issues of representation (i.e. recognition of 
independent unions as bargaining agents) and citizenship rights (easing of 
repression and repeal of authoritarian labor and security legislation that restricted 
the political activities of unions and other social groups) rather than bread and 
butter issues. One sociological survey found that political process theory was a 
better explanation for Korean strike behavior than economic strain theory, and 
that political facilitation as well as physical repression were significant in 
determining levels of strike activity during the period preceding and immediately 
following the initial transition to electoral rule. 
“The overall changing political milieu has stronger explanatory power than 
worker’s perception of economic hardships. Within the large domain of political 
process, the association between the government’s facilitative tactics and 
industrial disputes is far stronger than that between the regime’s repressive 
strategies and dissenting acts...Changes in government’s political control capacity 
are closely associated with the patterns of labor disputes in society.”14 However, 
after 1997 strikes came to center on the issue of layoffs and the use of temporary 
and part-time work, which undermined the traditional pattern of life-long 
employment characteristic of Korean labor relations. As several authors have 
mentioned, loss of employment entails a major loss of face in a society in which 
honor matters. This in turn has contributed to increases in divorce rates and 
suicides as it undermined the traditional structure of Korean society.15
This is not to say that the political nature of most strike activity did not have 
an economic impact, at least in the early days of the elected regime. In the words 
of one commentator describing the “breakdown” of authoritarian labor-capital 
relations, “the most obvious changes concern wage formation. Labor unions exert 
a much stronger influence over wage determination now. One result of this is the 
big increase in real wages. Real wages in manufacturing rose 8.2 percent in 1987, 
12.1 percent in 1988 and 19 percent in the first nine months of 1989, exhibiting a 
marked increase from the average annual real-wage growth rate of 5.7 percent 
during 1981-86.”16 From then on, earnings growth in non-agricultural activities 
steadily declined, falling from the high of 21.1 percent growth for 1989 to a 
contraction of 2.5 percent in 1998 before rebounding to 12.1 percent growth in 
1999.17 Put simply, recognition of unions has an upward impact on wages, so that 
the political nature of strikes eventually generates material rewards. 
In Korea during the transition it was political rationales that pushed strike 
levels upwards and which led to the rapid rise in union creation, increases in 
union membership numbers, and dramatic increases in real wages. This pattern of 
political agitation paving the way to material and organizational gains was repeated 
in the general mobilization of December 1997 to January 1998, when South Korea 
14 Mi Kyoung Kim Park, “Economic Hardships, Political Opportunity Structure and Challenging Actions: A Time 
Series Analysis of South Korean Industrial Disputes, 1979-1991,” Asian Perspective, V21, N.2 (Fall, 1997): 171. 
15 On the impact of changing labor relations on Korean society, see Jong-Il You, “Changing capital-labor relations in 
South Korea,” in Juliet Sehor and Jong-Il You, eds., Capital, the State and Labor. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995: 111-
151 and sources cited therein. 
16 Ibid: 143. 
17 Jooyeon Jeong, Foreign Labor Statistical Figures. Seoul: Korean Labor Institute (2000): 52 (Table III.5). 
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was brought to a virtual standstill by a wave of rolling strikes involving over three 
million people protesting the ramming through of anti-union labor legislation 
without parliamentary consultation or advance notice on the part of the Kim 
Young-sam government. After other social movements joined the protest against 
the assault on democratic procedure, the government relented, withdrew the 
legislative package and ordered across-the-board wage increases for both public 
and private sector employees (although it quietly re-introduced most of the 
contested labor laws to a compliant parliament in May 1998). Thus the question 
remains: did the move towards elected government fundamentally alter the 
situation of labor and its allies in civil society after the formal transfer of power 
was completed with the rotation in office of 1998? 
In spite of the gains made between 1987-90, organized labor remained 
relatively weak as a collective actor both before and after the transition to civilian 
elected rule. The Grand Conservative Coalition government of 1990-1998 
reversed many of the de facto gains of the labor movement and stepped up the 
repression of its most militant voices under the umbrella of the authoritarian labor 
legislation. It was not until after the election of Kim Dae-jung in December 1997 
that the authoritarian legislation was loosened to allow certain public sector 
employees to organize, the KCTU was legalized (in late 1999) and unions were 
permitted to lawfully engage in political activities (so long as that was not their 
main function). 
But Kim Dae-jung initially led a very fragile regionally based coalition 
between his liberal National Congress of New Politics (NCNP)—later reformed 
as the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in light of Kim’s appeal in local 
elections—and the conservative United Liberal Democrats (ULB). Moreover, his 
coalition was confronted by the political remnants of the authoritarian regimes in 
the form of the opposition Grand National Party (GNP)  as well as a host of 
regional rivals. As a former opposition leader imprisoned and sentenced to death 
(later commuted to life imprisonment) by the Chun regime in the early 1980s, 
Kim Dae-jung and his close advisors were repeatedly accused of pro-communist 
sympathies, which forced them to bend over backwards to alleviate such concerns 
and keep their political careers afloat. 
This resulted in a conservative, pro-business bias in the tone of government 
policy even after he was elected, and intensifying after the financial crisis of 1997 
in spite of the relaxation of controls on organized labor. With the defection of the 
ULB from the coalition in early 2001, Kim Dae-jung found himself with a 
minority government. The staggered mid-term parliamentary elections of 2000 
further weakened his authority as the MDP suffered losses of seats along both 
regional and ideological lines. Whereas his personal appeal remained strong in the 
public eye, the weakness of his party support in parliament forced Kim to 
continue the entrenched political habit of catering first and foremost to business 
interests. 
The political preferences of Korean workers also betray a conservative bias. 
There are no viable left or labor-based parties in South Korea, and what passes 
for “progressive” such as the NCNP/MDP are actually variants of standard 
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liberalism with a focus on civil liberties and individual rights—especially property 
rights. For their part, Korean workers have tended to support the mainstream 
parties (in spite of their ever changing names and coalitional make-up) in a 
roughly equal percent split among progressive, center-right and conservative 
choices, with a slight preference for the progressive side and a general antipathy 
towards politicians associated with the authoritarian era. Underlying this are deep-
seated regional divisions with strong personal overtones, which further undermine 
the cohesion of the working-class vote. 
For that reason, although several alterations to the Labor Codes have been 
made (again, by permitting union political activity, legally recognizing the KCTU, 
and allowing for regional or occupational federations, two unions per shop, 
limited public sector organizing and firm-specific economic strikes), and a 
national-level concertative forum called the Tripartite Commission was formed as 
a permanent ad hoc presidential advisory committee to discuss labor-business 
relations, the thrust of the authoritarian labor relations framework has been 
maintained to this day. This is evident not only in the fact that Korea is still not in 
accord with the majority of International Labor Organization standards for 
individual and (especially) collective labor rights, but in the very character of 
collective bargaining itself. Virtually all collective bargaining occurs between firms 
and individual shop level unions, with no coordination between shop unions 
within the same industries even though the large chaebol oligopolies are able to 
coordinate their actions with respect to unions in each industrial sector. More 
tellingly, less than ten percent of Korean workers are covered by collective 
bargains at all. 
Bargaining largely concerns wages, although non-wage issues such as holidays, 
bonuses, productivity ratios, worker involvement in management decisions, 
pension funds, occupational health and safety and dismissal have slowly crept into 
negotiations during the course of the 1990s. The focus on shop-level bargaining 
continued a long-term practice. According to Jooyeon Jeong, “among a total of 
5,733 enterprise unions in Korea, 84.5 percent (4,841 unions) were involved with 
enterprise, single-employer bargaining while only 14.9 percent (855 unions) were 
with multi-employer bargaining in 1997…Prior to mid-1987 besides low union 
membership and rate of unionization, labor had little or no collective voice even 
in unionized firms.”18
18 Jooyeon Jeong, “Pursuing Centralized Bargaining in an Era of Decentralization? A Pprogressive Union Goal in 
Korea From a Comparative Perspective,” Industrial Relations Journal, V.32, N.1 (2001): 60. In addition, the FKTU 
encompassed 23 industry-level unions, 3,778 shop level unions and 1,022,586 members in March 1998, while the 
KCTU covered 14 industry-level unions, 1,169 shop level unions and 455,483 members respectively. This means that 
most of the Korean labor movement remains tied to the authoritarian-created labor confederation and is seriously 
divided as a result. 
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TABLE 6.2 
Source: Hagen Koo, “The Dilemmas of Empowered Labor in 
Korea,” Asian Survey, V.40, N.2 (March/April 2000): 231 
(union numbers); Jooyeon Jeong, Foreign Labor Statistical 
Figures. Seoul: Korean Labor Institute (2000): 107 (union 
density and membership numbers); International Labor 
Organization, Trade Union Membership. Geneva: ILO
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The bottom line is clear: even if improved over the situation in 1987, on a 
collective level working-class consent is not a priority in Korea. 
Hence, after a brief period between 1987–90 in which labor asserted its 
political and social presence and gained limited rights, the pattern of labor 
subordination to business was restored. Although the total number of unions in 
South Korea rose steadily throughout the 1980s and accelerated dramatically after 
the 1987 elections, union density never exceeded 18.6 percent of the workforce 
(1989) and in fact fell steadily from that high point to just 11.5 percent of the 
total number of employees by 1998.19 This paralleled trends in strikes and 
number of unions.20
It should be noted that union dues are only paid to shop unions, which leaves 
regional federations and national confederations under-resourced and thus weak 
relative to their local counterparts. Moreover, this lack of financial support makes 
for a very small and weak national labor leadership, which undermines their 
presence in national level bargaining forums such as the Tripartite Commission 
(created in January 1998 to coordinate labor-business-state relations). 
Nor has organized labor gained a foothold with other social groups and 
movements beyond those established with students in the 1980s and the episodic 
coalition with similarly disaffected elements of society tactically focused on the 
same issues (as was the case with the general strike of 1997). The combination of 
a strong anti-communist ethos in Korean society, ideological disputes between 
collaborationist (with the dictatorships), cooperative (with the elites) and militant 
unionists (some class-compromise and social democratic-oriented, others class-
conflict and orthodox Marxist in nature), and the organizational weakness of the 
labor movement due to the decentralized nature of the (limited) collective 
bargaining system and ongoing divisions between the FKTU and KCTU, all 
conspired against the formation of national-level horizontal ties between labor 
and other anti-establishment groups. To this day organized labor lacks general 
public support except in specific instances (such as the February 2002 
demonstration against the visit of George W. Bush), and has yet to establish the 
community networks that allow it to assert an autonomous political presence 
beyond the immediate concerns of the rank and file. The only ongoing horizontal 
tie that labor maintains is that between the more radical unions and equally 
militant students, both of which are minorities within their respective peer groups. 
Part of the reason for this is the long period of wage growth and lifelong 
employment guarantees that were the hallmarks of the authoritarian 
developmental model in all of its guises, and which underpinned the elected 
regime’s approach to the labor “question” until 1998. On an individual level, 
Korean workers were guaranteed both job security and general welfare benefits 
under the authoritarian labor codes. The price for this was restrictions on 
collective action, political freedom and sectoral autonomy. For the bulk of the 
19 Ibid: 61 (Table 1). 
20 Hagen Koo, “The Dilemmas of Empowered Labor in Korea,” Asian Survey, V.XL, N.2 (March-April 2000): 231 
(Table 1); and Lim Hyun-Chin, Hwang Suk-Man and Chung Il-Jon, “IMF’s Restructuring, Development Strategy and 
Labor Realignment in South Korea,” Development and Society, V.29, N.1 (June 2000): 45 (Table 2). 
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urban working force, this was an acceptable exchange: with only a few glitches, 
real wages in manufacturing grew steadily both before and after the period of 
transition, reflecting the Korean state’s ongoing commitment to “buying” 
legitimacy with rising material standards for workers. Fueled by positive export 
market conditions, real wages for workers covered by collective contracts rose 6.4 
percent in 1986, 17.2 percent in 1987, 13.5 percent in 1988, and 17.5 percent in 
1989, then slowed down over the next eight years before contracting 2.7 percent 
in 1998 in the wake of the Asian financial meltdown.21
Although rebounding to positive figures in 1999–2001, overall wages barely 
kept ahead of inflation while unemployment stabilized around 9 percent, the 
highest levels since shortly after the Korean War. Much of the latter was due to 
the introduction in 1997–98 of labor laws that made it easier to hire temporary 
and part-time labor, dismiss workers, hire replacement workers during strikes, and 
withhold wages during strikes (i.e. de facto lockouts) again. In exchange, small 
improvements were made in labor’s political and organizational status, which 
satisfied the concerns of union leaders but had a devastating effect on previously 
life-tenured employees (the rank and file). In addition, a wave of bankruptcies in 
manufacturing after 1997 contributed to the rise in unemployment. Not 
surprisingly, unemployment rates soared after the labor flexibilization policies 
were enacted, with the percentage of unemployed rising from 2.6 percent in 1997 
to 6.8 percent in 1998 and the total number of unemployed tripling from 574,000 
to 1.7 million in the same period.22
The Kim Youngsam government began a process of labor law liberalization in 
April 1996 with the creation of a 30-member Presidential Commission on Labor-
Management Relations Reform. Rather than negotiate between labor and business 
interests, however, the commission eventually rubber-stamped business demands 
for labor flexibilization (particularly with regards to hiring and firing), something 
that led to the protests of December 1997 to January 1998. Even so, the 
subsequent signing of a Tripartite Accord on the part of the Tripartite 
Commission on February 6, 1998 paved the way for the incremental opening of 
the labor relations system, albeit with the trade-offs mentioned above.23
In essence, very little changed in the field of labor politics between 1987 and 
1997, and the changes that have followed have been drawn out, piecemeal, 
incomplete and mostly done around the margins of the relations in production. 
The first ten years of the “democratization” period were not propitious for major 
advances on the labor front, as the first two elected governments were both 
conservative in orientation and closely tied to chaebol interests. In 1998, with the 
coming to power of the former opposition coalition led by Kim Dae-jung, 
modifications were made that gave hope that genuine democratization of the 
21 Jeong (2001): 61 (Table 2). 
22 Kyung-San Chang, “Social Ramifications of South Korea’s Economic Fall: Neo-Liberal Antidote to Compressed 
Capitalist Industrialization,” Development and Society, V.28, N.1 (June 1999): 49-91. It should also be noted that the loss 
of manufacturing jobs in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis also contributed to the rise in unemployment. 
23 An overview and analysis of recent trends in Korean labor law is found in Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Commerce: South Korea, New York: EIU, July 2001: Section 10.2, 51-52. 
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labor relations partial regime was in store. Foremost among these changes was the 
creation of the national level Tripartite Commission. But even this concertative 
vehicle proved to be more symbolic than substantive, in that while it recognized 
labor as a legitimate social “partner” for the first time in Korean history, it did 
little in the way of substantively incorporating labor into the policy-making 
process, institutional framework governing labor relations, or in consultations 
about major issues of income and employment.  
In turn, hampered by its organizational, ideological and structural weakness, 
Korean labor unions have proven unable to impose an alternative agenda of their 
own and thus find themselves once again at the mercy of business interests, 
although since 1997 this has been more influenced by IMF rationalization dictates 
than the backroom dealings between politicians and chaebols. Whatever the case, 
recent trends in labor politics suggest that substantive democratization of Korean 
civil society is still a long way off. 
Taiwan
If South Korea’s pre-democratic labor relations regime could be characterized as 
exclusionary state corporatist—many elements of which continue to survive in the 
current political moment so that contemporary labor relations could still largely be 
thought of in this way—the subordination of organized labor in Taiwan during 
the same period relied on a slightly different mix of coercion and co-option. In 
short, while physical and legal repression still made up part of the picture, this was 
supplemented by the party-state’s sponsorship of trade unions in particular. Thus, 
we characterize the pre-1986 labor relations regime as inclusionary state-
corporatist, and given what we know about the influence of such similar systems 
on the consolidation of democracy in such countries as Argentina, but especially 
Mexico, we know that they are deeply embedded and shape the organizational and 
ideological bases of labor movements in very specific ways. Disentangling 
organized labor from dominant political parties is difficult, and union movements 
fostered in these environments tend to be bureaucratized (creating tensions 
between leaderships and rank-and-file union members), riddled internally with 
authoritarian legacies, and prone to collaboration with elites even if this serves 
neither the interests of their members nor the cause of democracy particularly 
well. In addition, it should be noted that while Taiwanese state corporatism has 
some affinities with its Latin American counterparts, for instance, some of these 
other well-noted cases relied on a mobilizational ideology in order to rally support 
for the authoritarian regime. The Taiwanese version, by contrast, is fundamentally 
and exceptionally demobilizational. 
The strategies of co-option associated with Taiwanese state corporatism were, 
in part, a general reflection of state-society relations on the island once the KMT 
was forced to retreat there in the late 1940s. While the repression of political 
dissidents through imprisonment or assassination took place especially during the 
very early phase and represented the KMT’s “stick,” the party also used a series of 
different “carrots” to ensure local loyalty to the regime. Importantly, land reform 
and State investment in industry during the import-substitution phase of 
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development (until 1960) helped to gain the support of the local population. 
Paralleling these developments, organized labor was more likely to be subject to 
outright repression during the first two decades or so of KMT rule. Once the 
regime shifted its development strategy to one of export-led growth in the 1960s, 
ideologically acceptable unionism was encouraged.24
The legal framework for the incorporation of labor into the KMT’s 
corporatist system was inherited in the form of the Labor Union Laws that were 
passed on the mainland in 1929. These gave the right to organizations with a 
minimum of thirty members to register as trade unions. Such bodies could be 
organized along either shop-level or occupational lines, but industry unions, 
usually the most politically oriented type, were effectively banned. Occupational 
unions, once established, needed to have monopoly representation within specific 
geographical areas. Strikes were generally banned, and unions had only one option 
with relation to which peak body they could affiliate to.25 The Chinese Federation 
of Labor was affiliated to the KMT. 
State sponsorship of ideologically acceptable unionism soon ensured that 
Taiwan had a union density rate comparable to many social democratic countries, 
and much higher than that of South Korea, Singapore or Hong Kong. However, 
union membership was never compulsory as it was in Australia or New Zealand, 
for example, so that even the higher estimates of union membership in Taiwan 
report that the percentage of employed workers who were union members 
averaged around 15 per cent during the 1970s before rising steadily to around 20 
per cent during the 1980s. But union membership and density data are only one 
indicator of union “strength,” and given the insertion of the trade union 
movement in an authoritarian labor political system and labor relations regime in 
general, labor was clearly a subordinate actor prior to the long drawn-out 
transition from authoritarian rule that began in the mid-1980s. 
Most writers date the process of Taiwanese democratization from 1986, 
though the constitutional reforms of that year and the lifting of martial law in 
1987 can be viewed more properly as the deepening of a process of political 
liberalization that had begun in the early 1980s. Because liberalization projects are 
eminently reversible, and are often at least initially designed to give legitimacy to 
the authoritarian regime in question rather than spark full democratization, the 
1996 general elections, the first in which the President was directly elected, can be 
regarded as the beginning rather than the end-point of democratization. 
Furthermore, given the enormous power that the President still wields in the 
political system, it was not until the KMT finally lost the Presidency to the 
Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian in 2000 that a meaningful 
rotation in office can be said to have occurred. 
24 This follows the scheme laid out in Joseph S. Lee, “Economic Development and the Evolution of Industrial 
Relations in Taiwan, 1950-1993,” in Anil Verma, Thomas A. Kochan and Russell D. Lansbury (eds.), Employment 
Relations in the Growing Asian Economies, London and New York: Routledge, 1995: 88-117. 
25 The details here are provided by Yin-wah Chu, “Democracy and Organized Labor in Taiwan,” Asian Survey, V.xxxvi, 
N.5, 1996: 495-510. 
75
TABLE 6.3 
76
       Like South Korea, Taiwan is thus still very much grappling with the 
challenges associated with the consolidation of democratic institutions that are 
capable of simultaneously delivering both horizontal and vertical consent. To state 
some of the rather obvious authoritarian legacies that reflect the fact that not 
everyone has subordinated their immediate interests to democratic processes, 
corruption (particularly the influence of organized crime), the role of 
conglomerates in politics, and the rather fluid and uncertain institutional 
relationship between the executive and the legislature are all ongoing concerns26.
Given this framework, it should be clear that the role of the labor movement in 
the new national political regime and in the labor relations partial regime in 
particular is still in the process of change. However, a few specific trends and 
developments can be noted, many of which do not bode particularly well for the 
garnering of mass contingent consent and the long-term prospects for the 
formation of substantive democracy in Taiwan. 
      The English-language literature on the role of organized labor in Taiwan 
during the democratic transition makes much of the growth of supposedly 
“militant” unionism, as part of a widespread mobilization of civil society, 
following the lifting of martial law and the (re)alignment of the party system at the 
political level.26 However, this analysis clearly overstates the scope and nature of 
labor organization during the period. Admittedly, industrial conflict did escalate 
after a total ban on strike action was lifted in 1987. Strikes steadily rose from a 
number of 907 in 1984 to a high of 4,138 in 1998, with the number of workers 
involved rising from 9000 in 1984 to 104,000 in 1998. Even so, the numbers of 
workdays lost to strike activity ebbed and flowed throughout this period, 
suggesting that while the number of strikes may have increased throughout the 
period before and after the opening of the political system, most of these 
remained local and of short duration.27
       In addition, it is important to note that even during such an intense period of 
regime change (or perhaps transformation), industrial action on the part of 
organized labor was not aimed at gaining a voice in the new political system or 
even within workplaces as one might expect. Instead of focusing struggles on the 
right to organize outside the old KMT-state corporatist system or on the right to 
expand its membership at the enterprise level, strike action remained economic in 
nature. Further than that, instead of focusing on wage gains or growth and the 
distribution of profit—usually the most important “bread-and-butter” issue for 
labor movements working within social or liberal democratic frameworks—
industrial disputes still tended to center on traditional claims such as end-of-year 
bonuses and other discretionary allowances.  
26 See Jou-juo Chu, “Labor Militancy in Taiwan: Export Integration vs Authoritarian Transition,” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, V.31, N.4, 2001: 441-465; Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, “The Rise of Social Movements and Civil 
Protests,” in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (eds.), Political Change in Taiwan, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1992: 57-74; Chyuan-jang Shiau, “Civil Society and Democratization,” in Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien, 
Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999: 101-115.  It is significant, as we will see, 
that these second two authors do not treat organized labor as anything special in national political life, simply as 
another group competing with other civil society organizations for a new place in the democratic system. 
27 Jooyeon Jeong (2000): 106-110 (Table VIII.1). 
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      Yin-wah Chu calculates that in the year following the lifting of martial law, 
more than 43 percent of disputes (whether or not they resulted in strike action) 
involved demands for increases in end-of-year bonuses, and between 1990 and 
1992 less than one percent of disputes involved the right to organize.28 Overtly 
political strikes are naturally still illegal, and even if union members can now elect 
their own leaders, rather than having them appointed by the KMT, the new union 
leadership is on the whole cautious and politically moderate. 
      In general, the growth of independent unionism exhibited similarly 
contradictory features. Overall, union membership in Taiwan rose from 1,371,000 
in 1984 to a peak of 3,278,000 in 1994 before receding to 2,927,000 in 1998. 
Union density followed a similar pattern, rising from 11.3 percent in 1984 to a 
high of 29 percent in 1993 before declining to 21.2 percent in 1998.29 However, 
most of this growth has occurred in occupational unions, following traditional 
patterns where membership is often driven by strict cost-benefit considerations 
on the part of workers. Industry unionism is still largely non-existent. Added to 
that, the formation of an independent peak union body, as an alternative to the 
still-KMT-dominated Chinese Federation of Labor, has occurred only very 
recently. The Taiwanese Confederation of Trade Unions was officially recognized 
by the state in May 2000 even if it had actually been formed several years earlier, 
illustrating the fact that the movement is still largely locked into a state corporatist 
system and the constraints on labor organization that entails. 
      This dependent relationship is also reflected in the inability of organized labor 
to find a new channel of representation in the new party system. Following the 
establishment of relatively free and fair electoral processes, the union movement 
had two choices if it was to break out of the clutches of the KMT: it could either 
form its own political party, or establish a relationship with one of the new broad-
based parties that were born after 1986. The first strategy was tried, and failed 
rather spectacularly. A new Labor Party was established in 1987, but soon split 
into two factions and quickly became politically irrelevant. The alternative 
Worker’s Party which claimed to have a “socialist” policy outlook was also 
unlikely to gain the support of voters in such a relatively affluent society which 
had been conditioned in a climate of extreme anti-Communism. 
      The second option of tying the fortunes of the labor movement to a 
mainstream political party has also been exhausted, since the main opposition 
party, the DPP, is the only real significant electoral challenger to the KMT and 
finds its main constituency in Taiwanese or Taiwanese-born business elites. The 
main problem here, in a similar sense to the way in which the North Korea issue 
clouds class politics in South Korea, is that factional and party politics revolve 
around the cleavage with China and the resulting debate over unification versus 
independence. In this context, pro-independence business leaders contest KMT 
traditionalists for political leadership, where both groups claim to act in the 
28 Chu (1996): 502. 
29 Jeong (2000): 106-110 (Table VIII.5). 
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national rather than business or other short-term interests. Labor has no clear role 
in this debate, and is effectively sidelined as a result. 
Although the details are quite different, Taiwan has, along with South Korea, 
had difficulties establishing tripartite mechanisms for solving labor disputes or, 
more generally, labor relations institutions that are conducive to the consolidation 
of democracy. Whereas South Korea had no real tradition of tripartism and so is 
in the process of creating these institutions from scratch, Taiwanese democracy 
inherited the old institutions and legal frameworks that were created under KMT-
state corporatism. One of the most important functions of the old system was to 
solve labor disputes before they evolved into strike or lockout action. However, 
because the trade union movement was little more than a creation of the KMT, 
organized labor acted as an agent of the state rather than an agent of its members 
during these negotiations. In fact, very little attention has been paid by either the 
published literature or international NGOs to this problem of reshaping state 
corporatist tripartite institutions into agencies that can (re)incorporate organized 
labor as an autonomous actor. Collective bargaining, so central to the channeling 
of mass contingent consent and despite the role of corporatism in the creation of 
a quiescent labor movement, is all but non-existent in Taiwan. In 1995, the 
International Labor Organization estimated that only 3.4 percent of workers were 
covered by such contracts.30 In short, “Taiwan has no works councils or 
representation of workers on corporate boards. It does not recognize Western-
style labor rights, and wages are set unilaterally by employers.”31
Much of this problem stems from the fact that state control over the union 
movement has not changed as much as the current government would like to 
argue. The International Council of Free Trade Unions, an ideologically and 
politically moderate group that adheres to ILO guidelines, sums up the present 
situation: 
Legislation authorizes the government to interfere indirectly in the internal 
affairs of trade unions. As a case in point, trade unions must submit their articles 
of association and rules to the authorities for review prior to official registration. 
The authorities can also dissolve unions if they do not meet certification 
requirements or if their activities constitute a “disturbance of public order”… 
There are many restrictions placed on the right to strike, which makes it 
difficult to hold a legal strike and undermines collective bargaining. The 
authorities can impose mediation or arbitration procedures for disputes that it 
considers to be serious or involve “anti-competitive practices.” During such 
procedures, the law prohibits workers from interfering with the “working order.” 
Severe sanctions are applied for failure to comply with the law, workers are not 
allowed to strike and employers are not allowed to take retaliatory action.32
30 International Labor Organization, World Labor Report 1997-98, Geneva: International Labor Office, 1997: 248 (Table 
3.2).  
31 Economist Intelligence Unit, Investing, Licensing and Trading in Taiwan, New York, December 1999: 46. 
32 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (2001), web 
version http://www.icftu.org/. 
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In the absence of collective bargaining structures, minimum labor standards 
are laid out in the Labor Standards Law (LSL) of 1984 and administered by the 
Council of Labor Affairs, which was established in 1987. Again, the law pays most 
attention to the regulation of fringe benefits, holiday payments, and bonuses. 
Apart from restrictions placed on the working-time arrangements for pregnant 
women, flexibilization of working hours is the key goal. An amendment to the 
LSL in 2000 reduced the working week from 48 to 42 hours, but more than a 
third of employees still work more than 44 hours per week.33 The law is also 
relatively silent on workplace health and safety issues and though the ILO does 
not report data on workplace accidents for Taiwan, it is clear that in all four little 
dragons, death and accident rates are still comparatively high. Besides that, 
making employers comply with the law at the enterprise level is also undoubtedly 
problematic.34 The key dilemma, as it is for the South Korean case, is not only 
that the new democratic regime is being built out of labor institutions and 
regulatory frameworks that are, at their core, authoritarian, but that this is 
occurring during a phase of economic liberalization. Pressures to contain wages 
and depress labor standards are placed by both increased employer militancy and 
international demands for labor market flexibilization. 
If working conditions are so bad, and workers still have a limited scope to 
organize channels through which to voice their concerns, why has not a more 
militant labor movement developed? Part of the answer lies in the long-term 
effects of State corporatist worker and union socialization, but a great deal is also 
explained by the ability of Taiwan’s export-oriented growth model to continue to 
deliver high wages and low levels of unemployment. Admittedly, the economic 
crisis of the past few years has taken its toll on growth, employment, and wage 
rates. Growth rates of earnings in non-agricultural activities rose steadily from 8.1 
percent in 1986 to a high point of 15.5 percent in 1989, before falling steadily to a 
low of 2.9 percent in 1999.35 However, the cumulative effect of many years of 
generous wage growth and relative wage equality meant that political voice could 
be traded for material gains, even after democratization had taken place. 
Over the long-term this is a tenuous and dangerous strategy. Vertical consent 
in democracies is contingent on the delivery of material benefits, but these must 
be backed up by institutions that are inclusive, and patterns of symbolic politics or 
shared political beliefs that “make sense” with respect to the concrete experiences 
of workers, now as citizens rather than subjects. It is during the bad or unstable 
times that such elements of national political life become crucially important. This 
is because consent based only on rising material thresholds is too contingent when 
lacking an institutional base. 
33 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce: Taiwan, New York, December 2001: 50. 
34 Lee (1995): 104. 
35 Jeong (2000): 52 (Table III.5). 
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Comparative Issues 
Legacies of inclusionary versus exclusionary state corporatism during the 
authoritarian era led to different paths towards labor politics democratization in 
these countries. In South Korea the state corporatist system was largely 
exclusionary in nature towards organized labor, and in large measure continues to 
be so. In Taiwan the state corporatist system was and is largely inclusionary in 
nature, with the union movement subordinate to the KMT but rewarded with 
political access and material benefits for its cooperation. In South Korea 
developmental policies and major economic restructuring were implemented 
abruptly and favored the development of large industrial conglomerates. In 
Taiwan developmental policies favored a less concentrated industrial structure and 
more gradualist adoption of economic modernization reforms. This followed the 
adoption of land reform and highly egalitarian income policies by the KMT in the 
late 1940s, which displaced class conflicts from the center stage of political life. In 
contrast, in South Korea the highly inegalitarian divide between rural and urban 
dwellers and marked disparities in wealth between upper and lower income groups 
made class based differences a salient aspect of political competition before and 
after the transition to elected civilian rule. South Korean political elites are 
therefore much more dependent on the business classes (and vice versa) than 
their KMT counterparts in Taiwan.36
After 1984 the rate of union density in Taiwan more than doubled relative to 
that of South Korea, as did the number of strikes. Even so, the numbers of 
workers involved in strikes and the number of man-hours lost were quite similar 
to those of South Korea, despite South Korea’s much larger working population. 
This leads us to believe that strikes in Taiwan were much more localized, shorter, 
and enterprise specific, whereas those of South Korea were more intense 
(measured as working-hours lost and workers involved) and more 
encompassing—read political—in nature. 
In Taiwan after the mid 1980s, real wage rates and the scope of collective 
bargaining outstripped those of South Korea, including the recessionary period of 
1997–99. In fact, real wages and collective bargaining coverage increased after the 
recession abated in Taiwan, whereas both declined (relative to previous years and 
absolutely) in South Korea until 2001. At a macroeconomic level, Taiwan 
continues to be located higher in the international division of labor than South 
Korea. The latter continues to be focused on low-wage intensive manufacturing, 
whereas Taiwan has adopted a strategy of growth promoted by skilled labor—
which requires labor’s cooperation, if not consent. 
To do so, Taiwan developed an extensive inclusionary state corporatist system 
of labor relations coupled with (dominant) Party-dependent labor insertion in the 
political system. Offering material and organizational inducements for 
cooperation over exclusionary constraints, the Taiwanese political elite, in spite of 
the move to the electoral contestation of leadership positions (a move required by 
36 On the similarities and differences between the two cases see Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufmann, The Political 
Economy of Democratic Transitions, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1995): 279-82. 
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external trade partners), continues to reward organized labor for its acquiescence, 
even during times of economic hardship. The precarious international legal status 
of the KMT regime and its ostensible successors may do more to explain this 
situation than any domestic considerations. 
In South Korea the basic framework governing labor relations remains largely 
exclusionary state corporatist in nature, albeit of a hybrid sort. The profoundly 
hierarchical nature of Korean society requires of the political elite that they follow 
the desires of local business elites, which means a very slow erosion of the 
tradition of despotic labor politics. But even if continually subordinated to the 
dictates of Korean capital and its international partners, organized labor in Korea 
has, in its exclusion, developed a degree of autonomy and independence that its 
Taiwanese counterparts lack.  Should the Korean labor relations system ever open 
up fully they will be in a far better position to advance basic rank-and-file 
objectives than their Taiwanese brethren, who have abdicated responsibility for 
the material fortunes of their memberships to the government of the moment. In 
Taiwan, it is the relationship between union leadership and government that 
matter in a labor relations system based upon labor political cooperation (and 
subordination). In South Korea it is the relationship between leaders and the rank 
and file that continues to fuel the logic of collective action in an adversarial 
system untouched by the politics of co-optation. 
Both countries retain bi-frontal state corporatist interest group administration 
systems in that business is always given preferential treatment over labor even if 
the state retains supreme authority over all interest group administration. Whereas 
the mix of inducements versus constraints is what separates the inclusionary from 
the exclusionary variants of state corporatist labor relations systems in both 
countries (since the legal framework remains essentially the same for both), with 
regards to business the system in both countries is heavily weighed in favor of 
inducements rather than constraints. Internal demand may be the cause of this. In 
Taiwan there is concern about working class consumption; in South Korea this is 
much less so. 
Conclusion
Democratic rule is desirable intrinsically (in terms of basic human rights) and 
because it provides a better guarantee for long-term peace and stability. But less 
attention has been devoted to the fundamental aspect of democratic rule that 
separates it from most authoritarian regimes: the simultaneous securing of both 
elite and mass contingent consent to the combination of politics and economics 
of the moment. For this reason attention to labor politics is important. 
Taiwan and South Korea have traditionally used specific mixes of labor 
repression and co-optation in order to maintain growth and stability, the 
differences between them having been emphasized here. For the various reasons 
discussed, neither type of labor relations system is compatible with long-term 
democratic stability based on the construction of vertical consent, for the simple 
reason that they do not allow the rank and file to master their own destiny. The 
state giveth and the state taketh away.
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Instead, South Korea has emulated Chile with regards to its labor politics, in 
that after a long period of authoritarian exclusion labor is granted political and 
social rights by an elected regime while at the same time losing the organizational 
and structural bases of strength (such as it existed) to the logic of labor 
flexibilization strategies adopted after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In Taiwan 
the situation is better in that workers are treated more equitably, earn more and 
suffer less exploitation than do their South Korean counterparts. But the price for 
this is obedience and a lack of autonomy in their collective action. Although this 
is certainly better than the exclusion felt by Korean workers, and whereas it 
arguably provides the basis for some modicum of consent being awarded the 
KMT regime, it also retains the overarching state and party controls on what 
unions can do and say. This is similar to the populist and neo-populist labor 
relations systems of Latin America that have periodically emerged since the 1930s. 
The prognosis is therefore mixed. While progress has been made towards 
opening the political system and liberalizing labor politics, both countries still 
retain strong authoritarian-corporatist traditions in the labor relations partial 
regime. Whereas authoritarian liberalization has led to procedural 
democratization, substantive institutional bases of democratic consolidation have 
yet to be established, much as has been the case in Latin America and former 
Soviet states.  In this measure it seems that the East (of Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries) has become the South (developing countries with 
authoritarian politics).37
37 The term comes from A. Przeworski when referring to the transitions in Eastern Europe. It applies here as well. See 
his Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 191. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 
Labour relations and transitions from authoritarian 
rule in South Korea and Taiwan
AUTHORITARIAN 
LABOR RELATIONS 
POLITICAL TRANSITION CONTEMPORARY LABOR 
RELATIONS 
Mode of 
incorporation 
Political 
insertion 
Period of 
authoritarian 
liberalization 
Period of 
democratic 
consolidation 
Mode of 
incorporation  
Political 
insertion 
SOUTH 
KOREA 
State-
dependent;Ex
clusionary 
state-
corporatist 
Excluded 
from political 
sphere; 
limited state 
sponsorship 
of unions 
1987-1996 1997-present Limited 
pluralism 
permitted; 
still largely 
state-
corporatist. 
No 
independent 
labor-based 
party; 
potential to 
act as lobby 
group. 
TAIWAN 
Party-
dependent; 
Inclusionary 
state-
corporatist 
Dependent 
on KMT 
sponsorship 
1986-1996 1996- present Some new 
scope for 
independent 
unionism; still 
largely state-
corporatist in 
that they 
require official 
recognition. 
No 
(electorally 
successful) 
independent 
labor-based 
party; 
attempts to 
cultivate 
relationship 
with DPP 
largely 
failed. 
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